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TIERED CONSENT AND 
THE TYRANNY OF CHOICE 
Natalie Ram* 
ARTICLE 
ABSTRACT: Regulations and doctrine governing human tissue research are facing 
immense pressure to ensure respect for the interests of tissue providers and of research-
ers. Tiered consent presents tissue providers with a menu of research categories to 
which they may consent, and it is a recognized best practice. Yet, evidence in consumer 
psychology suggests that abundant choice causes decision makers to experience infor-
mation overload, make arbitrary choices, refrain from choosing altogether, and experi-
ence regret following decision making. These patterns result in systematically lower 
quality decision making. This article fleshes out the potential limitations of expanded 
choice in tiered consent situations so that use of this best practice, and the laws and 
doctrine governing it, best approaches the ethical paradigm of informed consent. 
CITATION: Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 lurimetrics 
1. 253-284 (2008). 
"Nequid nimis.,,1 (In all things moderation.) 
In modern medicine, informed consent is a touchstone of ethical and legal 
practice. Physicians must generally obtain freely given and informed consent 
from patients before engaging in most medical interventions (except in certain 
circumstances, such as emergencies or where full information would, in fact, 
be detrimental to patient health), and researchers are held to an even stricter 
*Law Clerk, Hon. Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; J.D., Yale 
Law School, 2008. I am grateful to Fran~oise Baylis and Lynette Reid, with whom my work on 
tiered consent first began, and to my parents, whose love of science has nurtured my own (and 
whose editorial suggestions are always helpful). Special thanks also to Adam Banks, Christine 
Jolls, Dan Kahan, Judith Resnik, Reva Siegel, Larry Solan, and the Yale Law Teaching-Yale Law 
Women Works in Progress participants for their insightful comments and expert guidance. 
\. PuBLlUS TERENTIUS AFER (TERENCE), ANDRIA (THE GIRL FROM ANDROS) act I, sc. I 
(G.P. Shipp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1960). 
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standard to divulge material risks in obtaining participant consent. Yet, in-
formed consent requires much more than simply the provision of information, 
and obtaining adequate consent can be difficult as science moves forward and 
human tissue is its medium for experimentation. With the advent of genetic 
analysis, researchers hope to identify disease-related and other genes and to 
measure the frequency of such genes' occurrence across large populations. 
This kind of research requires massive cross-sectional bio-repositories of sam-
ples available for study. At the tum of the century, there were already more 
than 300 million tissue samples from more than 178 million individuals stored 
in the United States, and this number grows by more than 20 million samples 
every year. 2 
Careful consideration of the process of consent in the context of medical 
research using human tissues is needed. Although consent for research pur-
poses is not a new concept, consent for the research use of human tissues 
poses new ethical problems. Unlike other kinds of research involving human 
subjects, research using human tissues can extend over long periods of time 
and a single sample may be used in multiple (potentially unrelated) studies. In 
this sense, human tissue research is unique among research involving human 
subjects because of the scope of potential choice available to tissue provid-
ers-in theory, tissue providers might wish to consent to one, many, or all 
kinds of research, present and into the future. 
Federal regulations and judicial doctrine govern large swaths of research 
involving human subjects, but, as yet, agencies and courts have been unwilling 
to apply the necessary protections of informed consent to human tissue re-
search.3 Our national commitments to creating regulations for the ethical con-
duct of research,4 however, and our interests in facilitating effective and 
efficient research both point to the need for reform. Policymakers, ethicists, 
and researchers must find ways to adapt traditional doctrines and policies of 
informed consent to situations in which as few as one consent-generating 
interaction may give rise to mUltiple uses of a person's tissue, genetic infor-
mation, or other personal data. 
Tiered consent-which presents potential tissue providers with a menu of 
research categories to which they may consent-has been proposed as a "best 
2. ELISA EISEMAN & JASEN J. CASTILW, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES: A 
NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN TISSUE SAMPLES, at xvii (1999), available at http://www.rand. 
orglpubs/monograph_reportslMR954IMR954.sum.pdf. In 1998, the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NBAC) similarly reported that more than 282 million tissue samples were stored in 
the United States, accumulating at a rate of more than 20 million new samples per year. NAT'L 
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, REsEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOWGICAL MATERIALS: 
ETHICAL IsSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edul 
nbaclhbm.pdf. 
3. See infra Part LB. 
4. See NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL 
REsEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979). 
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practice" for moving forward ethically with human tissue research.s The avail-
ability of options enables providers to exercise some level of control over the 
future use of their tissues, while limiting the administrative and other burdens 
that diminish the effectiveness of consent models requiring frequent recontact. 
However, recent data emerging about consumer psychology raise flags about 
the shortcomings of radically expanded choice. These data indicate that while 
some choice appears to be beneficial-and therefore tiered consent is likely to 
remain a best practice-too much choice actually causes anxiety in decision 
makers as well as attempts to opt out of decision making altogether or to 
choose at random.6 There is good reason to believe that these behavior patterns 
will manifest as strongly, if not more so, in the context of tiered consent.7 
Therefore expanding the choices available to tissue providers too much will 
undermine, rather than buttress, the principles underlying informed consent. 
These findings are of no small import; national regulation and judicial doctrine 
playa central role in establishing boundaries for ethical research in the United 
States. Thus, policymakers, as well as bioethicists and legal scholars, need to 
account for the effects of abundant choice in identifying, advocating for, and 
implementing appropriate consent guidelines for human tissue research. 
This article aims to flesh out the potential limitations of expanded choice 
in tiered consent situations so that use of this best practice, and the laws and 
doctrine governing it, best approaches the ethical paradigm of informed con-
sent. Although the ethical components of informed consent for the use of hu-
man tissue in research, as well as their implementation in law, have been the 
subject of much discussion, authors have neglected the insights into decision 
making offered by studies in behavioral economics and decision-making psy-
chology.8 Likewise, most scholars of behavioral economics and decision-
making psychology have not paid significant attention to the interactions 
between their findings and the principles of informed consent generally, much 
less tiered consent. This article begins to fill in these blanks. Part I provides a 
5. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 64-65; ELISA EISEMAN 
ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF EXISTING HUMAN TISSUE REPOSITORIES: "BEST PRACfICES" FOR A 
BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCE FOR THE GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC ERA 137 (2003); Natalie Ram, 
Regulating Consent to Human Embryo Research: A Critique of Health Canada's Proposal, 14 
HEALTH L. REV. 19 (2005). 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See infra Part m. 
8. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton et aI., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored 
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786 (1995) (presenting the consensus statement emerging from a 
workshop of scientists, ethicists, lawyers, and consumers convened by the National Institutes of 
Health and the Centers for Disease Control and advocating a tiered consent and recontact model 
for the use of human tissue in research); Philip R. Reilly et aI., Ethical Issues in Genetic Research: 
Disclosure and Informed Consent, 15 NATURE GENETICS 16 (1997) (arguing for broader 
disclosure in infonned consent to the use of tissue for gene mapping research); David Wendler, 
One-Time General Consent for Research on Biological Samples: Is It Compatible With the Health 
Insurance Ponability and Accountability Act?, 166 ARCHNES INTERNAL MED. 1449 (2006) 
(arguing that a two-step consent process is required to comply with the requirements of HIPAA). 
See generally 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE: COMMISSIONED PAPERS 
(2000), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edulnbaclhbmII.pdf. 
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primer on the notion of "informed consent," explicating why informed consent 
is essential to ethical and productive research using human tissues, describing 
the ethical and legal standards for informed consent, and identifying three 
primary models for obtaining consent in the context of human tissue research. 
Part II explores recent findings on the psychology of decision making in the 
consumer context, and Part III applies these findings to tiered consent for 
human tissue research. The article concludes by identifying areas for future 
research and highlighting the critical role that law and policy, enriched with an 
understanding of decision-making psychology, must play in shaping the future 
of human tissue research. 
I. THE THEORY AND 
LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT 
A. Why Consent Matters to the Research Use 
of Human Tissues 
The right to decide whether and how one's body and its parts may be used 
in research has been described as a "fundamental" right,9 although courts have 
yet to recognize such strong protection for providers of human tissue for re-
search. Respect for the interest of tissue providers in controlling the ways in 
which their tissues, and the information contained in their cells, are used flows 
in part from respect for human dignity. Human dignity demands that all per-
sons be treated not merely as means to an end, but also as ends in them-
selves. 1O When individuals are made tissue providers without their knowledge 
and authorization, they may suffer the harm of physical invasion and depriva-
tion of their "autonomous right to be let alone.,,11 When individuals are not 
adequately equipped with information pertinent to their decision about 
whether or not to participate in a course of action, be it medical treatment, 
direct participation in research, or the provision of tissue for research, they 
suffer a dignitary harm by being deprived of their "autonomous right to 
choose.,,12 
Concern for tissue providers' interest in control is not merely academic. 
Many people invest every use of their body, or pieces of it, with moral and 
ethical significance. 13 Orthodox Jews, for example, often hold religious beliefs 
9. Robert M. Sade, Research on Stored Biological Samples Is Still Research, 162 ARCHNES 
INTERNAL MED. 1439, 1440 (2002). 
10. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary Gregor 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); see also Sade, supra note 9, at 1440 (arguing that 
tissue providers should be referred to as "research subjects" rather than as "sources" because the 
latter term "suggest[s] that [tissue providers] are things rather than willing persons"). 
II. Mary joy Ballantyne, One Man's Trash Is Another Man's Treasure: Increasing Patient 
Autonomy Through a Limited Self-Intellectual Propeny Right, 3 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 567, 576 
(2005). 
12.Id. 
13. Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Propeny and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 966 (1982) 
(describing "the body" as "quintessentially personal property because it is literally constitutive of 
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that the body must be buried whole; indeed, "if a person's leg is amputated 
during his or her life, arrangements are made to store that body part for burial 
with the individual after death.,,14 Many Native Americans hold similar beliefs 
about the integrity of the body.15 Limitations short of absolute refusal to the 
research use of tissues may also arise: 
[Sjome people may wish to limit the use of their samples to noncommercial 
entities. Others may wish to forbid the use of their samples to investigate 
certain disorders, particularly if the disorders are stigmatizing for a specific 
population group, such as an alcoholism gene might be. In addition, retaining 
tissue samples or immortalizing cell lines may violate cultural or religious 
beliefs. 16 
Thus, informed consent-really, informed choice-plays a critical role in 
protecting tissue providers' interest in control. As such, informed consent is 
fundamentally an expression of respect for human dignity: ''To say that one 
cannot be bound by a promise that one did not voluntarily and knowingly 
make is to say that the individual should be the author of her own undertak-
ings, that a genuine respect for her dignity requires a broad deference to her 
choices.,,17 
Yet, respect for the tissue provider's interest in control, and therefore a 
requirement for informed consent, emerges not only from considerations of 
respect for human dignity, but also from more consequentialist considerations 
about maximizing the amount of tissue available for research. Individuals may 
refuse to provide tissue for research if they fear that their interest in controlling 
the future uses of their cells and genetic information will not be respected. 
More troubling still is the possibility that concerns about the future use of cells 
obtained during routine medical care may cause individuals to forego such 
care. This has been reported anecdotally among African American women, 
who, recalling past abuses in medical interventions and research involving 
African Americans such as "the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment and 
the chaotic conditions attending early sickle-cell anemia carrier trait screen-
one's personhood"). Radin observes that "bodily parts may be too 'personal' to be property at all." 
Id. Nevertheless, she recognizes that "[i]f the body is property, then objectively it is property for 
personhood," and she links this understanding of the body to the tort of battery. Id. 
14. Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 25 
(2005). 
IS. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 49; see also Larry Rohter, In the 
AlTUlzon, Giving Blood but Getting Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,2007, at AI, C"A soul can only 
be at rest after the entire body is cremated,' said Davi Yanomami, a leader of the [Yanomami tribe 
in the Amazon of Brazil]. To have the blood of a dead person preserved and separated from the 
remainder of the body is simply unacceptable to us. "'). 
16. Clayton et aI., supra note 8, at 1788. 
17. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994); see also 
Allen Buchanan, An Ethical Framework for Biological Samples Policy, in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS 
ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at B-1, B-16 ("Informed consent is primarily a protect [sic] 
against nonconsensual bodily invasions and against dignatory [sic] harms that can generally be 
ranked under the category of treating persons disrespectfully, as if they were mere means for the 
pursuit of others' ends."). 
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ing,,,'8 have refused prenatal diagnosis out of fear about other uses that might 
be made of their amniotic tissue. 19 Thus, respect for informed consent has both 
a deontological and a utilitarian basis. 
Moreover, a tissue provider's interest in control over the use of her tissue 
in research embraces a number of important derivative interests, including 
interests in confidentiality and commercialization. A tissue provider'S interest 
in confidentiality is both an instrumental and fundamental privacy interest in 
protecting the provider from the negative impact of unwanted disclosure of 
information about the provider that is discovered through research. If third 
parties such as insurance providers or employers gain access to this informa-
tion, individuals may be denied health or life insurance covera§e, or they may 
lose their jobs on account of anticipated health problems. 0 Unrequested 
disclosure of information to the tissue provider or her family may also cause 
distress or embarrassment.21 These concerns pertain primarily to research 
18. Rayna Rapp, Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings of Bioscience in a 
Multicultural World, 23 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 45, 49 (1998). 
19. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori B. Andrews, Introduction: The Body, Economic Power and 
Social Control, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 3, 7 (1999) (citing Rapp, supra note 18); see also Donna T. 
Chen et al., Research with Stored Biological Samples: What Do Research Participants Want?, 165 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 652 (2005) (reporting an empirical study showing that, given the 
option to permit all future research use of their tissues, African Americans were less likely than 
whites to provide this unlimited authorization). 
20. Ted T. Ashburn et aI., Human Tissue Research in the Genomic Era of Medicine: 
Balancing Individual and Societal Interests, 160 ARCHNES INTERNAL MED. 3377, 3378 (2000) 
(noting that "there have been many documented cases of insurance and employment 
discrimination based on an individual's genetic makeup"); see also DOROTHY NELKIN & 
LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL 
INFORMATION 4, 7 (1989); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Calls for Genetic Privacy Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18,2007, at AI4 (reporting on President Bush's urging to Congress to pass a genetic 
privacy bill because "[ilf a person is willing to share his or her genetic information, it is important 
that that information not be exploited in improper ways" and "[wle want medical research to go 
forward without an individual fearing personal discrimination"). The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act promises to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of genetic 
information in employment and health insurance. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). This is an encouraging sign, although it is 
unclear how the Act will operate in practice. 
21. See Stewart A. Laidlaw et aI., Genetic Testing and Human Subjects in Research, 24 
WHmIER L. REv. 454, 460 (2002) ("Emotional or psychological harms from learning one is a 
carrier of a genetic disease can be devastating. This is particularly true when the onset of the 
disease is a virtual certainty, such as in the case of Huntington's disease."); see also Sonia M. 
Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic 
Infonnation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1860 (1993) ("Genetic data are also unique in how they may 
affect self-identity. Empirical evidence shows that the knowledge or assumption that one carries 
certain disease genes can affect self-perception." (citation omitted». If genetic analysis in research 
exposes mismatched paternity, this is likely to be stressful to existing family relationships as well 
as embarrassing to all parties involved. See Susan M. Denbo, What Your Genes Know Affects 
Them: Should Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Test Results to a Patient's 
Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. Bus. LJ. 561,598 & n.l62 (2006) (noting that "the revelation of 
genetic test results to family members may cause a special type of harm, one that some 
commentators have labeled the 'family secrets' problem"). 
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involving genetic analysis, as genetic information can serve as a basis for 
predictive diagnosis of future medical conditions or health risks?2 
The interests that tissue providers advance concerning the commercializa-
tion of products derived from their cells tend to follow one of two lines. One 
line contends that the commercialization of body products is wholly unethical. 
This focal point arises because some individuals have moral, ethical, or reli-
gious objections to the commercialization of pieces of the human body23 or 
concerns about the coercion and exploitation of those providing tissue.24 Alter-
natively, tissue providers may argue that those who provide the raw materials 
of research should share in the economic benefits of the fruits of that provi-
sion. 
Thus, tissue providers advance a number of strong claims, both 
deontological and instrumental, for why their preferences and choices should 
matter in research involving human tissue. Respect for provider consent there-
fore plays an essential role in creating a legal framework in which ethical 
research can take place. 
B. What Consent Requires 
Accepting that consent remains vital in the context of human tissue re-
search, the question then becomes what consent requires. In a classic treatise 
on consent, Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp identified five necessary ele-
ments of consent: disclosure; understanding; voluntariness; decision-making 
22. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 19-20 (describing the 
value of human tissue to cancer research); Francis S. Collins et aI., A Vision for the Future of 
Genomics Research, 422 NATURE 835, 835, 841 (2003) (describing the promise of the Human 
Genome Project, including "[c]linical opportunities for gene-based pre-symptomatic prediction of 
illness," and identifying a "Grand Challenge": to "[d]evelop genome-based approaches to 
prediction of disease susceptibility and drug response, early detection of illness, and molecular 
taxonomy of disease states"). 
23. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 49 ("Some individuals may 
object to the possibility that researchers could sell their samples to companies for profit."); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
24. See, e.g., Testimony on Egg Retrieval to California Senate Committee, Joint Oversight 
Hearing on the Implementation of Proposition 71, the Stem Cell Research and Cures Act: Joint 
Hearing Before the California Senate Subcommittee on Stem Cell Research Oversight, Senate 
Health Committee, and Assembly Health Committee, 2005 Leg. (Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of 
Francine Coeytaux, MPH, Pro-Choice Alliance for Responsible Research), available at http:// 
geneticsandsociety.orglarticle.php?id= 180 (noting that so long as financial inducement is avail-
able, most human eggs obtained for human cloning research will come from poor women); Donna 
Dickenson, Commodification of Human Tissue: Implications for Feminist and Development 
Ethics, 2 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 55, 55-56 (2002) (arguing that human eggs required for 
cloning research are likely to come from women in the southern hemisphere and to support re-
search in the northern hemisphere and available only to those in the North). In many of these 
instances, those who bear the burden of producing tissue for research may not be the ones who 
enjoy the benefits flowing from research. 
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capacity or competence; and authorization.25 Each of these facets of consent 
imposes duties on practicing medical professionals and research scientists. 
Disclosure requires professionals to impart necessary and material information 
to patients and research subjects.26 Much emphasis and academic and profes-
sional literature focuses on the disclosure aspect of consent. 27 Indeed, the 
emphasis on disclosure is evident even in the term of art "informed consent," 
which stresses the availability of information. 
Despite less focus in the relevant literature, the other four aspects of con-
sent are also critical. Understanding requires that professionals ensure that 
information is intelligible to nonmedical experts and that individual patients 
have understood the information disclosed to them.28 Like disclosure, under-
standing is crucial to ensuring that consent is "informed."29 Voluntariness 
demands that consent be freely given.3o Excessive physical, mental, or even 
financial inducements to consent are unethical and vitiate consent because the 
notion of consent is meaningless where no true option of refusal exists. 
Decision-making capacity informs the elements of understanding and volun-
tariness by requiring that patients or research participants (or their legal repre-
sentatives) be competent to understand and make decisions?) Competence is 
necessary to ensure that vulnerable persons are not exploited and that those 
providing consent are legally and ethically capable of doing SO.32 Finally, 
although the word "authorization" lends itself to the affirmative decision to 
proceed, it is meant to signify that the individual in question must make an 
25. RUTIi R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 274 (1986). Faden and Beauchamp initially identify the second element of informed 
consent as "comprehension," but they later use the language of "understanding." [d. at 298-336. 
Additionally, Faden and Beauchamp name the fifth component simply "consent." They rightly 
note, however, that the locution applied to this element is contested. [d. at 274-75. They later 
deploy "authorization" in describing informed consent as "a specific kind of autonomous choice." 
[d. at 277. This article uses the term "authorization" to align its understanding of consent with this 
model of autonomous authorization, id. at 277-80, and to acknowledge that not all informed 
consent interactions will, in fact, result in consent to participation. See also infra text 
accompanying note 33. 
26. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 308. 
27. See id. at 275-76. The Supreme Court has likewise defined informed consent solely in 
terms of disclosure. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) 
("One might well wonder ... just what 'informed consent' of a patient is .... [W]e are content to 
accept, as the meaning, the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and 
as to its consequences. "). 
28. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 314-19, 326-29. Faden and Beauchamp 
identify understanding as one of the three core conditions of autonomy. [d. at 248-55. They later 
devote an entire chapter of their book to the role of understanding for informed consent. [d. at 
298-336. 
29. [d. at 305. 
30. [d. at 337. Like understanding, Faden and Beauchamp identify voluntariness as a core 
condition of autonomy. [d. at 256-62. The relationship between voluntariness, autonomy, and 
informed consent is more fully addressed in a later chapter of their book. [d. at 337-81. 
31. [d. at 287-93. 
32. [d. 
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affIrmative decision either to proceed with or to refuse a proposed medical or 
research intervention.33 
These fIve ~rinciples of consent underlie and animate legal doctrines of 
consent as well. Where consent is inadequate or incomplete, patients and re-
search participants have successfully brought tort claims arising under battery 
and negligence.35 Competency is critical to legal claims regarding consent, as 
minors and incompetent persons are generally legally unable to provide valid 
consent.36 Medical professionals who perform procedures without authoriza-
tion from patient-participants may face claims of battery.37 Likewise, where 
consent has been coerced, tort doctrine dictates that such consent is invalid and 
a battery has occurred.38 Medical professionals who do not adequately disclose 
material risks may also be subject to tort liability under negligence.39 The 
scope of required disclosures has oscillated between two primary standards: 
33. Id. at 278. 
34. Faden and Beauchamp posit that it is "morally axiomatic that [infonned consent as 
autonomous authorization] ought to serve-and in fact ha[s] served-as the benchmark: or model 
against which the moral adequacy of a definition framed for [infonned consent as effective 
consent] is to be evaluated." Id. at 284. 
35. See, e.g., Bryson v. Stone, 190 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Stover v. Ass'n of 
Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
36. See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 36 (defining a "incompetent person" 
as "one who ... is unable to give an infonned consent," and noting that "[m]inors ... are 
presumed incompetent in law, whereas adults can generally be declared legally incompetent only 
on the basis of some 'factual' determination"); GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 371 (3d ed. 2007) (observing that some individuals are deemed 
incompetent because they "lack specific or general capacities" and are "in need of a guardian to 
make decisions for them," while others, such as minors, are "de jure incompetent for most 
purposes"). For federal regulations governing the inclusion of children as subjects of research, see 
45 C.F.R. § 46 Subpart D (2007). 
37. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958) (,,[W]here 
a physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative situations and no 
immediate emergency exists, a patient should be infonned of the alternative possibilities and given 
a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation."); Isaac v. Jameson Mem'l 
Hosp., 932 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ("A claim of a lack of infonned consent sounds in 
the intentional tort of battery because an operation perfonned without the patient's consent is 
deemed to be the equivalent to a technical assault."). The most widely cited fonnulation of 
infonned consent comes from an early-twentieth century opinion considering a battery claim. In 
Schloendorffv. Society of the New York Hospital, Justice Cardozo stated, "Every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to detennine what shall be done with his own body; and a 
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he 
is liable in damages." 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 
143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
38. JAMES F. DRANE, CLINICAL BIOETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL-ETHICAL 
DECISION MAKING 127 (1994). 
39. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 
P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 28-30 (describing the 
negligence theory of liability in infonned consent doctrine). Although physicians may be liable for 
failure to disclose under negligence, it is often difficult for plaintiff-patients to make the requisite 
showings to carry their claim, particularly with respect to causation. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil 
B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Tons: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607. Thus, we should pause before concluding that infonned consent must be 
and is collected before every specific intervention-the actual practice of medicine may leave us 
disappointed. 
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the professional practice standard and the reasonable person standard.40 
Natanson v. Kline, an early and influential account of the professional practice 
standard, held that "[t]he duty of the physician to disclose ... is limited to 
those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under 
the same or similar circumstances.,,41 Later, in Canterbury v. Spence, a classic 
case addressing the duty to disclose, the court described "true consent" as 
what happens to one's self in the informed exercise of a choice, and that en-
tails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the 
risks attendant upon each. The average patient has little or no understanding 
of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can 
look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From 
these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in tum the re-
quirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a 
decision possible.42 
Under Canterbury, physicians have a general legal duty to disclose all material 
risks-material risks being those that "a reasonable person, in what the physi-
cian knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to 
attach significance to . . . in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed 
therapy.,,43 Despite Canterbury's prominence, the professional practice stan-
dard has remained the majority rule.44 Nevertheless, both standards take as 
their starting point the physician's duty to disclose to her patients information 
necessary to make an informed decision whether to proceed.45 In this fashion, 
legal doctrine has attempted to incorporate ethical principles governing con-
sent. 
Similarly, federal regulations governing human subjects research have 
also been structured around the ethical principles of informed consent.46 In the 
40. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 30-33. Faden and Beauchamp also identify a 
third standard, governed by the subjective needs of an individual patient, but they rightly note that 
this standard has not gained much traction in legal doctrine. Id. at 30, 33-34. 
41. 350 P .2d at 11 06. 
42. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnotes omitted). 
43.464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Infonned Consent to 
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970». 
44. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 31; see also id. at 32 (observing that many state 
courts declined to adopt the Canterbury standard, and that some states that did adopt Canterbury's 
rule have subsequently adopted the professional practice standard by statute). See generally 
Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modem Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's 
Duty To Infonn Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d 1008 (originally published 
1978). 
45. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104 ("'A physician violates his duty to his patient and 
subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an 
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.'" (quoting Salgo v. Leland Stanford 
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957». 
46. The modem legal baseline for informed consent for participation in human subject 
research emanates from the Nuremburg Code. Pennissible Medical Experiments, in 2 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949). Today, human subject research is often governed by statute at the 
state and federal level. 
262 48 JURIMETRICS 
Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice 
United States, research involving human sUbjects conducted using federal 
monies must comply with the Common Rule. 7 The Common Rule requires 
researchers to provide potential research participants with extensive informa-
tion in the course of obtaining informed consent, including information about 
the expected risks and benefits of the research and confidentiality procedures 
to be followed, as well as assurance that participation is optional and may be 
withdrawn at any time.48 The FDA imposes similar requirements for all studies 
submitted for its review.49 Together, these two federal standards govern the 
vast majority of human subjects research conducted in the United States. 
To date, agencies and courts have been hesitant to impose these consent 
requirements on researchers obtaining human tissue for use in research, and 
human tissue research has therefore become a particularly thorny problem for 
traditional formulations of informed consent. In 2004, the federal Office of 
Human Research Protections issued a guidance document stating that "tissue 
collection for present or future research purposes is not subject to the IRB 
review and informed consent provisions of the Common Rule, as long as there 
is no personally identifiable information attached to the tissue specimens."so In 
2006, the FDA followed suit.S1 In the famous Moore case, the California 
Supreme Court hinged John Moore's ability to lodge a claim of lack of in-
formed consent to the research and commercial use of his cells on the fact that 
his physician was acting in the role of both physician and researcher.s2 How-
ever, whether researchers interacting with tissue providers in a purely research 
relationship legally owe any similar duty of care is less obvious. In Greenberg 
v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc., for instance, the district 
court stated, "[t]here is no automatic fiduciary relationship that attaches when 
a researcher accepts medical donations and the acceptance of trust, the second 
constitutive element of finding a fiduciary duty, cannot be assumed once a 
donation is given."s3 The court in Greenberg held that the duty of informed 
consent could not be extended to require disclosure of a researcher's commer-
47.45 C.F.R. § 46.101-.409 (2007). 
48. § 46.116(a)-(b). In some instances, these requirements for informed consent may be 
waived, as where research poses only "minimal risk" to participants. § 46.116(d); see also § 
46.116(c) (setting forth additional circumstances under which the requirements for informed 
consent may be waived). 
49. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 812 (2007). 
50. M. B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving Human Subjects: Do You 
Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335,336 (2006). 
51. 71 Fed. Reg. 1429, 1430 (Jan. 9, 2006) (providing notice that the "FDA intends to 
exercise enforcement discretion when ... [t]he study uses leftover specimens[,] ... [t]he speci-
mens are not individually identifiable[,] [t]he specimens are provided to the investigator(s) without 
identifiers[,] ... [t]he individuals caring for the patients are different from ... those conducting 
the investigation[,] and the study has been reviewed by an IRB [institutional review board]"). 
52. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
53. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). But see Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001) 
(holding that "under certain circumstances, [informed consent agreements in nontherapeutic 
research projects] can, as a matter of law, constitute 'special relationships' giving rise to duties, 
out of the breach of which negligence actions may arise"). 
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cial interests. 54 Indeed, that court expended considerable energy in deciding 
whether researchers have any duty to obtain infonned consent from tissue 
providers.55 Most recently, in Washington University v. Catalona, the Eighth 
Circuit eliminated nearly all provider control over the use of tissue samples in 
a university repository---despite the presence of informed consent documents 
with more limited language-by giving unrestricted ownership of the samples 
to Washington University, cabined only by a limited right to withdraw. 56 
In large part, these decisions are motivated by concerns that demanding 
consent in the context of human tissue research will be detrimental to scientific 
progress. For instance, Judge Limbaugh, who presided over the Catalona 
matter in the district court, declared, "[m]edical research can only advance if 
access to these materials to the scientific community is not thwarted by private 
agendas.,,57 Likewise, in Moore, the California Supreme Court opined that 
recognizing Moore's property right in his cells would have a chilling effect on 
socially beneficial medical research.58 The FDA similarly asserted in its notice 
that "the existing [consent] requirements are bringing a halt to a class of very 
valuable research that can produce new diagnostic tests, without appreciably 
adding protection for human subjects.,,59 
Yet, as Part I.A makes clear, enabling tissue providers to exercise their 
interests in the use of their cells in research is essential to the ethical and ef-
fective conduct of research.60 The same principles that undergird infonned 
consent doctrine in the contexts of medical treatment and traditional human 
subjects research-including respect for autonomy and human dignity-sup-
port the need to obtain consent to the use of human tissue for medical re-
search.61 Moreover, instrumental interests in maximizing the amount of 
research-available tissue likewise point to giving teeth to consent in the con-
text of human tissue research. Ultimately, both the interests of tissue providers 
and the interests of researchers must be accorded adequate respect and protec-
tion. If either set of interests is not properly attended to, the interests of both-
54. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71. 
55.Id. at 1068-70. The court concluded that "in certain circumstances a medical researcher 
does have a duty of informed consent," but it did not specify how one can identify when a duty 
does or does not attach. /d. at 1070. 
56. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), cerr. denied, 128 S. Cl 
1122 (2008). 
57. Washington Univ. v. CataIona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 490 
F.3d 667, cen. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008). 
58. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (,The second 
important policy consideration is that we not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties 
who are engaged in socially useful activities, such as researchers who have no reason to believe 
that their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be, against a donor's wishes."). 
59.71 Fed. Reg. 1429 (Jan. 9, 2006). 
60. See supra Part I.A. 
61. See supra Part II.A; see also Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in 
Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2007) (arguing that considerations 
of autonomy requires informed consent to the use of human tissue in medical research). 
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as well as the interests of society at large-will be thwarted.62 Thus, policies 
regulating consent in the context of human tissue research must attempt to 
square ethics with practical and legal realities. 
C. Models of Informed Consent for Human Tissue Research 
In moving forward with human tissue research, three basic models of 
consent have developed. First, blanket consent may be obtained, in which 
potential tissue providers are asked to consent to all possible future research 
uses of their tissue. This model of consent is often preferred by administrators 
and regulators, as it imposes the fewest administrative burdens. For example, 
following the royal assent of Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction Act,63 
Health Canada, the body responsible for promulgating regulations pursuant to 
the Act, announced that it would require only blanket consent for individuals 
providing gametes for third-party assisted reproduction in Canada--once gam-
etes are designated for third-party use, they come under the control of the 
gamete recipients, who may decide at a later date to allocate embryos created 
from those gametes to research purposes.64 Blanket consent for research is also 
often obtained from patients at routine medical appointments. In many cases, 
physicians or hospitals use admission forms containing language such as "I 
give my doctor permission to dispose of my tissues or use them in research.,,65 
Many ethicists and legal scholars have rejected blanket consent models on 
grounds that they do not even approach true informed consent. 66 After all, 
human tissue research encompasses a broad range of activities, and tissue 
providers who wish to contribute to some research projects may not want to 
participate in others. Blanket consent therefore demands consent that cannot 
be fully informed, and it may oblige consent to research that some individuals 
may find morally objectionable.67 As a general model of consent, blanket 
consent is impermissibly overbroad. 
At the other end of the spectrum is project-specific consent, under which 
tissue providers are contacted before each use of their tissues for research in 
order to provide the opportunity for consent. Project-specific consent best 
62. See Ashburn et aI., supra note 20, at 3381 (noting that failing to mediate tensions be-
tween donors and researchers "may dissuade patients from participating in medical research 
studies and slow progress in medical research"). 
63. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.c., ch. 2 (Can.). 
64. See Assisted Human Reproduction Section 8 Regulations, 139 C. Gaz. (Pt. 0 § 13(d) 
(Sept. 24, 2005); see also Ram, supra note 5 (critiquing Health Canada's then-proposed regula-
tions). 
65. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16.2006, at 38. The 
appropriateness of obtaining such consent in a general admission form (that many patients do not 
read) is debatable at best. However, given that Skloot reports that some physicians do not obtain 
even this limited consent, id., some appreciation may be due to those physicians that make the 
limited effort to attempt to obtain consent of any kind for tissue donation. 
66. See, e.g., Clayton et aI., supra note 8; Ram, supra note 5, at 23; Sade, supra note 9, at 
1439. It is also worth noting that some authors have observed that blanket consent also does not 
meet the legal requirements of the Common Rule or HIPAA. See, e.g., Wendler, supra note 8. 
67. Ram, supra note 5, at 23. 
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approaches the paradigm of informed consent, as it makes available to tissue 
providers the most precise information for a given consent interaction. Be-
cause tissue providers consent to one research project at a time, they are neces-
sarily more informed about the specific research projects in which their tissues 
are used. Nevertheless, although theoretically possible, project-specific con-
sent has not been commonly used in the context of human tissue research 
because of its administrative burdens to researchers (for example, maintaining 
accurate phone or mail records and tracking tissue providers and their consent 
decisions)68 and psychological burdens to tissue providers (continued 
confrontation with consent interactions can be stressful and bothersome for 
providers, especially when tissue was obtained in the course of treatment for 
illness).69 
Straddling the midpoint between blanket and project-specific consent is 
tiered consent, which attempts to preserve the benefits of blanket and project-
specific consent models while minimizing their disadvantages. Tiered consent 
allows research participants to choose from a number of options, but does not 
oblige tissue providers to consent to any, some, or all categories of research. 
Furthermore, because tiered consent often includes an option for recontact to 
obtain project-specific consent, tiered consent strengthens the ability of poten-
tial tissue providers to make their wishes known. In this respect, tiered consent 
protects consent as both freely given and informed.7o 
At the same time, tiered consent may minimize the administrative burdens 
associated with project-specific consent processes by standardizing the range 
of research categories to which tissue providers may consent and obtaining 
this consent upfront, rather than continually as research projects arise. Tiered 
consent thus assuages many of the concerns identified by courts and regulators 
declining to impose consent requirements on those obtaining tissue for re-
search purposes. 71 
Yet, in attempting to ensure adequate provider choice while limiting 
administrative and researcher burdens, tiered consent is also a process con-
stantly in tension. The ethical (and sometimes legal) demands of true informed 
consent exert pressure towards continually expanding menus of research cate-
gories to which potential tissue providers may consent. More research options, 
each of which embraces a narrower range of research projects, would seem to 
increase the probability that a given tissue provider truly understands and 
68. See P.N. Furness & M.L. Nicholson, Obtaining Explicit Consent for the Use of Archival 
Tissue Samples: Practicallssues, 301. MED. ETHICS 561, 561 (2004). 
69. See PEOPLE SCI. & POL'y LTD., BIOBANK UK: A QUESTION OF TRUST: A 
CONSULTATION ExpWRlNG AND ADDRESSING QUESTIONS OF PuBLIC TRUST I, 12 (2002), 
hnp:llwww.ukbiobank.ac.ukI docs/consultation. pdf. 
70. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 65. The legal status of tiered 
consent is not uncontroversial. For instance, although the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission recommended tiered consent for obtaining consent to future use of tissues in re-
search, some commissioners expressed concerns that tiered consent may not meet legal thresholds 
for disclosure. ld. To date, 1 am not aware of any complete and rigorous analysis of the legal status 
of tiered consent. 
71. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
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shares in the nature and goals of the research to which she is consenting. Inso-
far as autonomy, understood in rational choice terms, is a guidepost to in-
formed consent theory and doctrine, proliferation of tiered consent options is 
likely to be demanded. Tiered consent thus represents a delicate balance be-
tween the competing but interdependent interests of tissue providers on the 
one hand (who might otherwise demand more information and more research 
categories among which to choose) and the interests of researchers on the 
other hand (who might otherwise desire fewer restrictions on access to tis-
sues).72 
Tiered consent is most frequently encountered in cancer research, where 
tumor tissue plays a key role in understanding how cancer develops and pro-
gresses and in developing new treatments.73 Patients undergoing biopsy or sur-
gery are routinely asked to provide their excised tissues for research pur-
poses.74 Consent for such provision often takes the form of tiered consent 
presenting three options: 
1. My tissue may be kept for use in research to learn about, prevent, or treat 
cancer. 
2. My tissue may be kept for use in research to learn about, prevent or treat 
other health problems (e.g., diabetes, Alzheimer's disease, or heart 
disease). 
3. Someone from xyz may contact me in the future to ask me to take part in 
more research.75 
However, in a recent report that displays the tensions seemingly inherent 
in formulating tiered consent processes, the Tissue Access Working Group of 
the National Dialogue on Cancer Research has questioned whether this con-
sent model "go[es] far enough" in protecting patient choice.76 The Working 
72. In this sense, one might view tiered consent as analogous to intellectual property rights 
like copyright, which also seek to maintain a "delicate balance" between two interdependent and 
competing groups of interests in free expression. See David Nimmer et aI., The Metamorphosis of 
Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 22 n.9 (1999) (describing the widespread metaphor of 
copyright as a "delicate balance"). 
73. Nat'l Cancer Inst. & Nat'l Action Plan on Breast Cancer, Model Consent Form for Use 
of Tissue for Research, http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/specimenslmodel.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Model Consent] (setting forth the model informed consent document 
for the National Cancer Institute); Nat'l Cancer Inst. & Nat'l Action Plan on Breast Cancer, 
Patient Information Sheet, http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/specimenslpatient.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Patient Information Sheet]. The importance of human tissue in 
cancer research was a key point in the recent Catalona litigation. See Brief for Am. Cancer Soc'y 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th 
Cir. 2(07) (Nos. 06-2286 & 06-2301) ("Research using biological materials stored in 
biorepositories is an indispensable tool in the national effort to discover new ways to detect, 
prevent, and treat cancer and other diseases."). 
74. See Brief for Am. Cancer Soc'y as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, supra 
note 73, at 8 ("It is common, for example, for cancer patients undergoing biopsy or surgery 
involving removal of malignant or benign tissue to consent to a small amount of the tissue being 
stored for later research."); Patient Information Sheet, supra note 73. 
75. Model Consent, supra note 73. 
76. Univ. of S. Me. Bioethics Project, What Is Tiered Consent? (Dec. 27, 2005), 
http://www.usm.maine.edulbioethicslbiobanklethicaUicltiered.html. 
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Group identified several additional parameters along which patient-provider 
choice could be expanded, including type of sample, type of research (parsed 
more finely than in the current form), type of specimen to be provided, type of 
researcher, duration of storage time, and type of products, if any, to be derived 
from the tissue.77 
Proposals for tiered consent for other types of research have also ap-
peared. For example, I have proposed elsewhere a model for tiered consent for 
individuals providing gametes for third-party use that would preserve the abil-
ity of such providers to control whether embryos created using their gametes 
would be eligible for research use and, if so, for what kinds of embryo re-
search.78 Drawing on categories of embryo research identified in British 
legislation, this model for tiered consent suggested at least eight potential 
research categories. More generally, the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission has also advocated the adoption of tiered consent processes for 
human tissue research, although no precise number of research categories was 
identified.79 
As research progresses and expands, the number of substantively and 
ethically diverse uses for human tissue in research likewise expands. Human 
embryos may be used to develop more efficient techniques of in vitro fertili-
zation, or safer abortifacients, or embryonic stem cell lines that may serve as 
the substrate for research wholly unrelated to reproduction. The same is true 
for other kinds of tissue research--cancer tissue, for instance, may now be 
cultivated into stem cell lines that can be directed toward a host of research 
projects beyond anything contemplated even in the recent past. And human 
skin cells may now be reprogrammed to become pluripotent stem cells-a feat 
most of us knew nothing about even a few months ago. 80 As noted above, if 
consent is to be truly informed, this would seem to demand that the number of 
research categories in tiered consent processes must also expand. The Tissue 
Access Working Group's proposal for expanded choice in tiered consent proc-
esses for research use of cancer tissue is real world evidence of the concern 
that expanding avenues of research requires expanding tiered consent menus. 
Yet, beyond a certain point, more choice may frustrate informed decision 
making, rather than aid it. If regulations governing research and judicial doc-
trines imposing liability for faulty procedures are to engender processes that 
permit potential research participants to make free and informed choices about 
providing their tissues for research purposes, it is essential that policymakers 
understand and incorporate findings about the dynamics of decision making in 
constructing appropriate consent processes. 
77. /d.; see also EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 134. 
78. Ram, supra note 5, at 24. 
79. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 64--65. 
80. See Kazutoshi Takahashi et aI., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult Human 
Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 861 (2007); Junying Yu et aI., Induced Pluripotent 
Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Somatic Cells, 318 SCI. 1917, 1917 (2007). 
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF DECISION MAKING IN SITUATIONS 
OF ABUNDANT CHOICE 
Traditional social science theory suggests that more choices are preferable 
to fewer choices: "[T]he standard line among social scientists who study 
choice [is that i]f we're rational ... added options can only make us better off 
as a society.,,81 For those who seek just the "right" thing, more choices mean a 
greater probability of success.82 Alternatively, for those who do not really care 
one way or another, additional choices can simply be ignored.83 
In general, this logic seems compelling. "[C]hoice improves the quality of 
our lives. It enables us to control our destinies .... Choice is essential to 
autonomy, which is absolutely fundamental to well-being. Healthy people 
need and want to direct their own lives.,,84 This is precisely the understanding 
of autonomy and liberty that undergirds the traditional doctrine of informed 
consent. 
Yet, social science researchers are discovering that "the fact that some 
choice is good doesn't necessarily mean that more choice is better.,,85 Such 
findings are antithetical to classic economic theory because this theory does 
not admit to limitations in human cognition or to potential psychological 
tradeoffs that must be made when many, as opposed to few, options are avail-
able.86 Behavioral economics and decision-making psychology, meanwhile, 
draw attention to precisely these tradeoffs. Indeed, researchers in these fields 
have found that more choice can actually demotivate decision making and 
decrease satisfaction when choices are made.87 
This Part focuses on the implications of hyperchoice for decision makers. 
The Part that follows then explores what effect these implications are likely to 
have in the context of informed consent using a tiered model. Current research 
suggests four primary pitfalls to abundant choice: information overload; arbi-
trary selection; avoidance of decision making; and regret. Each of these will be 
discussed in tum. 
81. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 19 (2004). 
82.ld. 
83.ld. 
84.ld. at 3; see also EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 30 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1985) (discussing research 
suggesting that autonomy enhances intrinsic motivation); GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS 
PARADOX (2003) (arguing that the standard of living in modem America far exceeds that of 
almost all people throughout human history); Diane I. Cordova & Mark R. Lepper, Intrinsic 
Motivation and the Process of Learning: Beneficial Effects of Contextualization, Personalization, 
and Choice, 88 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 715 (1996); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When 
Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000) (documenting several books and journal articles demonstrating that 
provision of choice can be positive). 
85. SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 3. 
86. See id. 
87. See infra Part II.B-C. 
SPRING 2008 269 
Ram 
A. Information Overload 
Data on the effects of consumer hyperchoice and information overload 
flrst surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s.88 These studies showed that the human 
mind is not of limitless capacity and that the information available for decision 
making can only be of some flnite magnitude before the mind is simply over-
whelmed.89 Defining "information load" as "a mUltiplicative function of the 
amount of product attributes and alternative information available for a single 
decision,,,90 these researchers and their modem counterparts have identifled 
two axes along which information overload can occur. First, decision makers 
experience information overload when presented with an overwhelming num-
ber of options that must be considered simultaneously.91 Second, decision 
makers experience information overload when presented with an overwhelm-
ingly complex decision, even when only a few options are available, because 
of the many details or attributes of each option that need to be considered.92 
Most research on the constraints of information load has focused on the former 
problem, and most of this research has focused on decision making by con-
sumers in market settings. 
When individuals experience information overload, research suggests that 
they adopt a variety of methods for simplifying the decision-making process.93 
For instance, decision makers adopt "simplifying rules,,94 or rely on "simple 
heuristics,,,95 discarding or ignoring a great deal of available information and 
focusing instead on a manageable subset of characteristics-in other words, 
they essentialize. This behavior has been shown to lead to lower quality deci-
sion making in situations where there were clearly superior options given the 
benefits available for the price charged.96 Alternatively, some studies have 
suggested that as the number of options and the information about those op-
tions increases, decision makers often consider only a small subset of the total 
choices available.97 This means that decision makers exclude a broad range of 
88. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues, 
14 J. MARKETING RES. 569 (1977) (acknowledging the existence of infonnation overload and 
discussing empirical and methodological mechanisms for measuring it); Naresh K. Malhotra, 
Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER REs. 419, 427 (1982) (dis-
cussing the "dysfunctional effects of infonnation overload"); William M. Wilkie, Analysis of 
Effects of Information Load, 11 1. MARKETING RES. 462 (1974) (arguing that the manner in which 
brand infonnation is combined has an effect on the manner in which consumers interpret it). 
89. Jacoby, supra note 88, at 571-72. 
90. David Glen Mick et aI., Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose: 
Emerging and Prospective Research on the Deleterious Effects of Living in Consumer 
Hyperchoice, 52 J. Bus. ETHICS 207, 208 (2004). 
91. Id. 
92.Id. 
93. See id. at 209. 
94.Id. 
95. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 996. 
96. Mick et aI., supra note 90, at 208. 
97. John R. Hauser & Birger WemerfeIt, An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration Sets, 
16 J. CONSUMER REs. 393, 404--{)5 (1990). 
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options without really evaluating them, once again an outcome likely to lead to 
lower quality decision making. 
Notwithstanding these data, some scholars have advanced the view that 
the use of heuristics can, in some situations, lead to more accurate decision 
making.98 Among the most well known of these fast and frugal decision-
making techniques is the Take the Best heuristic. Take the Best, when mod-
eled on a computer, is used to arrive at an answer simply and easily. Even 
where multiple types of relevant information to decision making are provided, 
a system running Take the Best will consider only one criterion of information 
at a time-starting with the criterion with the highest validity, or relative fre-
quency with which the given criterion will identify the right answer.99 If, based 
on that single factor alone, one possible answer is indicated, this answer will 
be adopted, and the remaining criteria will never be considered. If the initial 
factor does not make an answer plain, the criteria with the next highest validity 
will be tested-alone-and so on, until an answer is indicated. loo The key to 
Take the Best is that each criterion of information is tried independently; in-
formation learned from one criterion is not retained when the next criterion is 
tested. Take the Best adopts as its motto "take the best, ignore the rest.,,101 In 
the real world, Take the Best might operate when, faced with massive amounts 
of information, we simply ignore the vast majority of available information in 
favor of focusing on one or two key and manageable criteria. 
In studies comparing the accuracies of Take the Best and regression 
analysis (which integrates a large amount of information in arriving at a deci-
sion) at predicting which of two cities is larger, the fast and frugal heuristic 
was able to predict city size with nearly as much, and in some cases more, 
accuracy than a more complicated and time consuming regression analysis. 102 
In these studies, ten criteria, such as whether the city had a soccer team or a 
university, were available for analysis. 103 Multiple regression analysis, which 
integrated and considered all ten variables, identified the larger of two cities 
with 65.7% accuracy.l04 Meanwhile, Take the Best, which considered only 
three criteria, made accurate choices 65.8% of the time. 105 These data have led 
some researchers to laud these heuristics as critical to human survival and far 
from detrimental to functional decision making in many contexts. 
98. See generally SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 
1999). 
99. Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, 
in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART, supra note 98, at 80. 
100. Id. at 81. 
IOl.ld. 
102. Id. at 87-88. 
103. Id. at 85. 
100.ld. at 87. 
105.ld. 
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B. Checking Out: Of Jams and Exams 
Hyperchoice conditions and the difficulties of information overload can 
lead not only to essentializing, but also to efforts to "check out" of the 
decision-making process altogether. Available research points to two ways in 
which individuals experiencing information overload attempt to escape deci-
sion making. In some cases, where the number of available choices is so great 
as to be "truly daunting," rather than trying to choose, ~eople may disengage, 
choosing almost arbitrarily to complete the process.,,1 In other cases, where 
individuals have an option not to participate in decision making at all, they 
will do so, opting instead for the status quo. In a third, distinct pattern, re-
search suggests that sequential decision making is psychologically fatiguing 
and that later-made decisions are likely to be more arbitrary or oriented to-
wards the status quo. 107 
Opting out has been demonstrated recently in a series of studies involving 
the purchase of exotic jams in a grocery store and the successful completion of 
an extra-credit assignment by college students in an introductory social psy-
chology course. 108 In the fIrst study, shoppers at an upscale grocery store en-
countered booths offering free sampling of Wilkin and Sons jams. 109 The 
booths varied in whether they offered six jams for tasting (the limited choice 
condition) or twenty-four (the extensive choice condition). I 10 Each participant 
could sample as many of the available jams as desired. Following tasting, each 
participant was given a coupon to save one dollar on the purchase of a Wilkin 
and Sons jam. III Shoppers interested in purchasing jams did so from the regu-
lar jam aisle, where they encountered all available varieties ,of Wilkin and 
Sons jams (as well as jams from other brands).ll2 The results were startling. 
Although more people initially approached the extensive choice booth to par-
ticipate in sampling of jams (sixty percent of those who passed the extensive 
choice booth stopped, while only forty percent of passing shoppers stopped at 
the limited choice booth; X2 (1, N = 502) = 19.89, p < 0.001), far more indi-
viduals who had visited the limited choice booth subsequently purchased jams 
(thirty percent of limited choice participants versus only three percent of ex-
tensive choice samplers; X2 (1, N = 249) = 32.34, p < 0.0001).113 The research-
ers concluded that although extensive options may at fust appear more 
appealing than a limited array of options, "having 'too much' choice seems 
nonetheless to have hampered [participants'] later motivation to buy.,,114 In 
106. Barry Schwartz et ai., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 
83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1179 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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107. Mick et ai., supra note 90. 
108. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84. 
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others words, when faced with choosing among a larger number of options, 
more individuals opted simply to make no selection at all. 
In the second study, students in an introductory social psychology class 
were presented with the opportunity to submit a two-page essay as an extra-
credit assignment. 115 Student sections were provided with either a list of six 
potential essay topics (the limited choice condition) or a list of thirty topics 
from which to choose (the extensive choice condition)!16 The results again 
were striking. Students with the limited choice list were more likely not only 
to submit extra-credit essays than students faced with the extensive choice list 
(seventy-four versus sixty percent completion; X2 (I, N = 193) = 3.93, p < 
0.05), but also to perform slightly, but significantly, better on those essays than 
extensive choice students (graded on a ten-point scale, limited choice writers 
scored on average 8.09 points, while extensive choice writers scored only 7.69 
points; F(I, 124) = 5.65, p < 0.02).117 Again, these results confirmed that fac-
ing "extensive options does not necessarily lead to enhanced motivation when 
compared with contexts that offer a limited array of [options].,,118 Moreover, 
student scores demonstrated that among active participants (that is, essay writ-
ers), individuals in limited choice settings tend to outperform those in exten-
sive choice settings. 119 Indeed, Iyengar and Lepper reported that even where 
students in the two groups selected the same essay topic, students in the exten-
sive choice group performed worse than those in the limited choice group. 120 
These studies suggest not only that individuals experiencing information 
or choice overload tend to avoid decision making by opting out of active par-
ticipation, but also that when they do participate they tend to do less well. 
Iyengar and Lepper suggest that this second finding may result because indi-
viduals in hyperchoice situations adopt simplifying heuristics for decision 
making. 121 Choice mediated through such simplifying heuristics may lead 
decision makers "to feel less committed to exercising their preferences." 122 
Finally, studies examining the effects of sequential decision making also 
suggest that decision makers tend to opt out of making decisions when over-
whelmed. 123 One study found that after making an initial difficult decision, 
individuals faced with another difficult decision were more likely to opt for the 
115.ld. at 998. 
116.ld. 
117. Id. In addition to the statistical tests conducted and reported in the study, a t-test statistic 
measuring the statistical significance of differences in the mean values between two groups may 
be helpful. Having conducted a t-test, the results show that the differences in average grades in 
study 2 between limited choice and extensive choice participants is statistically significant (p < 
0.01). 
118.ld. at 999. 
119.ld. 
120. See id. (,The condition effect was ... significant for [overall grade), F(I, 124) = 5.65,p 
< .02, with students in the limited-choice condition receiving higher grades (M = 8.09, SD = 1.05) 
than those in the extensive-choice condition (M = 7.69, SD = 0.82)."). 
121.1d. 
122.ld. 
123. Mick et aI., supra note 90. 
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status quo and other risk-averse options.124 Another study documented that 
after making binary choices across different product classes, participants who 
had made numerous choices were significantly less able to persist at an un-
solvable puzzle or to force themselves to continue drinking a distasteful bever-
age than the control group.125 These results strongly suggest that making 
difficult decisions is strenuous and fatiguing, and that making multiple and 
sequential decisions leads to declining willpower and informed decision mak-
ing. 126 
c. Regret 
A third trend in findings on the implications of hyperchoice is that 
individuals making decisions in hyperchoice settings tend to experience more 
frustration in decision making and more regret afterwards. For instance, in 
analyzing the extra-credit essay writing results, Iyengar and Lepper hypothe-
sized that "choosers in extensive-choice contexts ... may feel more responsi-
ble for the choices they make because of the multitude of options available.,,127 
That is, given more options, individuals may feel more pressure to find the 
"best" one and are more likely to fear or experience regret once they have 
made a decision. 128 Fear of regret, in tum, may cause individuals to refrain 
from choosing one option among many-once again, opting out of decision 
making. 129 
To test whether regret or fear of regret influences decision making, 
Iyengar and Lepper devised a study in which individuals were asked to select a 
Godiva chocolate that they would buy for themselves based on name and ap-
pearance alone. 13o Participants were presented with either six or thirty op-
tions. 131 Participants were then given the opportunity to taste a chocolate. 132 
Some groups were not given a choice about which chocolate to taste; the re-
maining groups were offered the chance to sample the chocolate they had 
indicated previously.133 Finally, all participants were presented with two 
different compensation mechanisms: either five dollars in cash or a box of 
Godiva chocolates worth five dollars. 134 
124. ld. at 208 (discussing a study by Jason Riis and Norbert Schwarz). 
125. ld. at 208-09 (discussing Roy Baumeister & Kathleen Vohs, Willpower, Choice, and 
Self· Control, in TIME AND DECISION: EcONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECfIVES ON 
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 201 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003». 
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The results of this study showed that individuals given extensive choices 
found the decision-making process to be both more enjoyable and more frus-
trating than individuals did in either the limited choice or no choice setting. 135 
In measuring satisfaction following decision making, Iyengar and Lepper 
found that participants in the extensive choice condition were significantly less 
satisfied with their sampled chocolates than were participants in the limited 
choice condition, although both of these groups reported higher satisfaction 
that those in the no choice condition. 136 
Barry Schwartz and colleagues tie regret to individuated decision-making 
approaches. 137 Schwartz and colleagues posit that there are two types of deci-
sion makers: maximizers, who always seek the "best" option, and satisficers, 
who generally seek a "good enough" option. 138 While having more choices 
may mean that maximizers are more likely to find just the right product or to 
make just the right choice, having more choices also means that there is a 
greater risk of not choosing the best option. 139 If a better option later becomes 
available or apparent (or perceived), maximizers are likely to experience re-
gret. 140 Maximizers may be more likely to avoid making decisions in the first 
place, to minimize the opportunity for making a "wrong" decision. Satisficers, 
meanwhile, are less likely to be distressed if a better option subsequently ap-
pears because of their orientation towards "good enough" options rather than 
"best" ones. 141 Therefore, satisficers are less likely to experience regret and 
less likely to opt out of decision making, even when choices are abundant. 142 
III. ABUNDANT CHOICE AND TIERED CONSENT 
Despite the intermittent references of several authors to medical decision 
making and hyperchoice,143 the vast majority of available research in this 
growing field focuses on consumer psychology in which a prospective buyer 
must choose one product out of a large number of similar products. In the 
tiered consent context, conversely, each option represents a possible research 
choice, but all, some, or none of these options may be selected simultaneously. 
Thus, where the problems of hyperchoice result from an inability to accurately 
weigh opportunity costs, such problems may not arise for potential tissue pro-
viders facing tiered consent because the opportunity cost of providing tissue to 
option A rarely includes an inability to provide tissue to option B. This seems 
most salient in considering the effects of regret on decision making. After all, 
if one is concerned about the possibility that B will tum out to be better than A, 
135.ld. at 1002. 
136.ld. at 1003. 
137. Schwartz et aI., supra note \06. 





143. See, e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 1004; Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of 
Choice, SCI. AM., Apr. 2004, at 70, 74. 
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then the ability to select both A and B limits the possibility of missing out on 
the "best" choice. 
However, there are good reasons to believe that the problems experienced 
in consumer hyperchoice will also manifest themselves in tiered consent hy-
perchoice. This Part applies the findings of consumer choice psychology iden-
tified in Part II to tiered consent, demonstrating that the difficulties of 
consumer hyperchoice are likely to occur with as much or more effect in the 
high stakes context of providing tissue for research as in the context of the 
grocery store. 
A. Information Overload 
Research finding that individuals faced with information overload tend to 
ignore a great deal of available information or a number of available options is 
distressing for those concerned with informed decision making. Informed 
consent, after all, focuses not only on disclosure of relevant information, but 
also on a potential tissue provider's competency and ability to understand and 
make use of that information. In the tiered consent context, if the number of 
available options is overwhelming, potential tissue providers may uncon-
sciously choose to ignore several options, depriving them of the opportunity to 
provide tissue to research they may find enriching upon closer inspection. 
Alternatively, potential tissue providers may attempt to choose among a vast 
array of options by adopting an essentializing heuristic and thereby ignoring 
swaths of relevant and important information about each option, which could 
lead to truly uninformed decision making. 
Tiered consent may also be a source of information overload not only 
through offering too many options to be simultaneously considered, but also 
by virtue of the fact that the decision to be made is likely to be a complex one. 
Most tissue providers are not medically or scientifically trained, and this limits 
their ability to grasp subtle nuances in scientific methodologies, to consider the 
broad range of research for which they may be providing their tissues, or to 
understand the tradeoffs implied in selecting one set of research options over 
another. The disclosure of a vast quantity of information, even about a limited 
set of available options, may therefore be a disservice to potential tissue pro-
viders, if it causes decision makers to ignore a great deal of that information 
and therefore to make less informed decisions. 144 
For example, in the United States, human oocytes may be donated (or 
bought) for research purposes.145 Because oocytes are a finite resource, their 
144. The same may hold true for disclosure of information in the medical treatment setting, 
wherein there is strong legal incentive for physicians to disclose all available information as a 
shield to liability. 
145. At present, there is no federal law banning the sale or donation of human oocytes (eggs) 
for research purposes, although no federal funds may be used in connection with any research on 
human embryos and funding is only available for a limited number of human embryonic stem cell 
lines. See President's Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, 37 PuB. PAPERS 32 (Aug. 9, 
200 I). Some states have enacted legislation that regulates assisted human reproduction and that 
may govern access to donor eggs. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125350 (West 2007) 
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allocation to one research use necessarily reduces the number of eggs available 
for other research purposes. This is especially so with respect to embryonic 
stem cell research, which is a highly inefficient process at present. l46 Thus, it 
is critical that potential oocyte providers understand each option independently 
so that they are best able to allocate their oocytes in accordance with their 
values. Indeed, informed consent doctrines and regulations must be designed 
to create processes that permit potential tissue providers to make choices ac-
cording to their values-this is the core of the autonomy-human dignity norm 
of informed consent. 147 In cancer research, patients providing their tissue "for 
use in research to learn about, prevent or treat other health problems,,148 may 
not understand just how broad a range of research projects this provision may 
encompass-"other health problems" may include Alzheimer's research, but it 
may also include research directed at deriving stem cell lines and learning how 
to differentiate stem cells into specialized cell types. 
In the context of consent, it is critical that all relevant information be 
processed and integrated so that decisions are maximally informed. This must 
be true for each option in a tiered consent menu. Excluding options from con-
sideration or employing essentializing decision-making heuristics to exclude 
certain data about each option undermines the purposes of tiered consent and 
consent in general. Policymakers, ethicists, and researchers charged with de-
signing informed consent processes must recognize and respond appropriately 
to this kind of limitation in human cognition and understanding, so that tiered 
consent processes serve, rather than undermine, the goals of informed consent. 
(prohibiting the sale of human oocytes for research); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2(05) 
(requiring individuals accessing assisted reproduction to enter into a written agreement for the 
disposition of unwanted gametes and embryos). Moreover, the National Academies has issued 
ethical guidelines for human embryonic stem cell research that recommended that gamete donors 
be compensated only for expenses and not for their eggs or sperm directly. See Amy Adams, 
Guidelines Issued for Embryonic Stem Cell Research, STANFORD REP., Apr. 27, 2005, at 4, 
available at http://news-service.stanford.edulnewS/2005/apriI27/med-stemcell-042705.html. How-
ever, these guidelines are hortatory and do not have force of law. 
146. Stem cell derivation from human embryos succeeds roughly thirty-five percent of the 
time. See Lisa M. Hoffman & Melissa K. Carpenter, Characterization and Culture of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cells, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 699, 700 (2005) (percentage was obtained 
by averaging values reported in "percentage of ceU lines from ICMs"). 
Interest in human embryonic stem cell research may wane in the face of new sources of 
pluripotent stem cells, see supra note 80 and accompanying text, but embryonic stem cells are 
nevertheless likely to remain significant for some time to come. See Univ. of Wis.-Madison, 
Scientists Guide Human Skin Cells to Embryonic State, SCIENCEDAILY, Nov. 21, 2007, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/20071111071120092709.htm ('Thomson [the head of one of 
the labs that announced the derivation of pluripotent stem cells from human skin cells] notes ... 
that more study of the newly-made cells is required to ensure that the 'cells do not differ from 
embryonic stem cells in a clinically significant or unexpected way, so it is hardly time to 
discontinue embryonic stem cell research. "'). 
147. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ('"True consent to 
what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice 0 0 . 0")' 
148. Model Consent, supra note 73. 
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Moreover, while the success of fast and frugal heuristics like Take the 
Bese49 might suggest that adopting heuristics does not undermine the ability of 
tissue providers to make choices consistent with their values, there is good 
reason to believe that the demonstrated success of these heuristics does not 
correlate with usefulness in informed consent. In the first instance, it is not at 
all clear that individuals have fixed preferences among different decision-
making variables (fixed criteria validity) in the technical arena of medical 
decision making,150 nor is there any objectively "right answer" when it comes 
to providing tissue for research. Furthermore, the studies cited throughout Part 
II indicate that hyperchoice settings are particularly ill suited for accurate 
decision making by fast and frugal heuristics. Indeed, some studies have 
shown that information overload and reliance on heuristics lead to lower qual-
ity decision making in situations where objectively superior options exist. 151 
More specifically, research shows that lower quality decision making is espe-
cially likely to occur when the decision to be made demands emotional or 
manual investment from the decision maker. 152 For example, when students 
were provided with either limited or extensive numbers of choices for extra 
credit essays, individuals in the limited choice setting outperformed those in 
the extensive choice setting, even when students selected the same essay 
topiC. 153 As Iyengar and Lepper noted, choice mediated through simplifying 
heuristics may lead decision makers "to feel less committed to exercising their 
preferences." 154 
Providing tissue for medical research is likely to be an arena in which 
decision making is, in fact, emotionally or manually demanding, especially for 
certain kinds of tissues. Unlike consumer goods, in which having a stereo, for 
instance, is clearly a good, tissue provision is not always so clear. For exam-
ple, providing human eggs or embryos is not such an unqualified good. Some 
individuals feel strongly that no human embryo research should be conducted. 
Others feel that although embryo research on the causes and treatment of in-
fertility is valuable, embryo research to develop abortifacients or embryonic 
stem cell lines is morally reprehensible. Even those who find embryo research 
of all kinds morally neutral may experience moral anxiety in egg or embryo 
donation simply because it brings to the forefront their lack of moral engage-
ment with an issue that is so morally relevant for most others. Thus, tiered 
consent procedures that encourage or demand the adoption of decision-making 
heuristics are likely to disserve potential tissue providers by alienating them 
from a true possibility of making choices according to their interests, and this 
disservice is only exacerbated as the emotional or moral stakes of tissue provi-
sion increase. 
149. See supra Part II.A. 
150. On the lability of preferences, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1167-70 (2003). 
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B. Checking Out 
Again, results showing that individuals in situations of hyperchoice at-
tempt to "check out" of decision making and perform less well when decisions 
are made155 are troubling in thinking about informed consent and tiered con-
sent models. According to these research results, presenting potential tissue 
providers with more options to which they may consent is likely to lead to less 
informed decision making if potential tissue providers arbitrarily select options 
in a tiered consent menu or attempt to opt out of making a decision by check-
ing a blanket consent option. Alternatively, hyperchoice in tiered consent 
could lead to less tissue overall being provided for research, as potential tissue 
providers choose to opt out of providing tissue altogether because the prospect 
of decision making is too overwhelming. These behavior patterns appear espe-
cially likely to manifest in contexts like tiered consent, in which the highly 
technical nature of medical research and the relative inability of the ordinary 
tissue provider to understand the nuances of proposed research categories 
coincide with a potentially large number of categories about which to process 
information. 
The results on sequential decision making are particularly significant. 156 
Tiered consent demands sequential decision making because tissue providers 
are permitted and encouraged to consider providing tissue to multiple types of 
research. Thus, choosing one research option does not necessarily preclude 
selection of all others. Indeed, because each option represents an independent 
opportunity to provide tissue for research, tiered consent is more likely than 
consumer hyperchoice to present difficulties associated with sequential deci-
sion making. Most studies on sequential decision making track numerous 
binary (yes-no) choices-precisely the type of decision making that occurs in 
tiered consent. Evidence of psychological fatigue leading to less informed 
decision making suggests that even where tissue providers strive to make 
informed decisions, they may simply be psychologically incapable of doing so 
in the repeated iterations required for extensive tiered consent. 
None of these outcomes is desirable-from either an informed consent or 
an efficient research perspective. Opting out and arbitrary selection brought 
about by hyperchoice obfuscate the basic purpose of offering tiered consent, 
which is permitting tissue providers to exercise control over the destiny of 
their tissue (and, more specifically, their genetic material) while minimizing 
administrative monitoring costs. More generally, consent theory and doctrine 
are concerned with the design of processes that facilitate informed choice, and 
therefore both uninformed authorization and uninformed refusal are problem-
atic. 
155. See supra Part U.B. 
156.ld. 
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C. Regret 
Finally, findings regarding patterns of regret in decision making are 
significant in the context of consent. 157 These patterns of regret matter to 
evaluation of informed consent processes because regret, or fear of regret, may 
lead to opting out of decision making. As observed above, opting out under-
mines the purposes of informed consent generally and the delicate balance 
between control and efficiency sought in tiered consent in particular. IS8 
Regret is likely to appear with greater force in the context of tiered con-
sent than in settings of consumer choice. Findings on regret show that exten-
sive choice can be demotivating when the decision to be made is a trivial 
one-whether to buy jam, write an extra-credit essay, or accept chocolates 
rather than cash as compensation. IS9 When the stakes of decision making are 
higher, as in the provision of tissues for research purposes, the possibilities for 
regret are likewise greater. Indeed, Iyengar and Lepper identify medical deci-
sions as those that are likely to exacerbate the demotivating effects of hyper-
choice, as these are decisions "in which [] the costs associated with making the 
'wrong' choice, or even beliefs that there are truly 'wrong' choices, are much 
more prominent, and/or [] substantial time and effort would be required for 
choosers to make truly informed comparisons among alternatives."I60 In other 
words, while abundant choice alone may be sufficient to trigger reactions of 
regret in decision making, these reactions are amplified as decision making is 
laden with emotional or moral weight. 
As noted in Part lILA, providing eggs and embryos for research, for 
example, is often fraught with moral significance, and tissue providers may 
have strong opinions about different types of embryo research. Even for those 
who view egg and embryo provision and related research as morally neutral, 
the consent-provision process-the need to think about what research projects 
constitute ethical egg and embryo research-may be emotionally burdensome. 
The act of providing these traditionally "special" tissues for research may 
bring about feelings of moral inadequacy, a sense that "I ought to care more 
(and if! don't, what's wrong with me?}." Yet, egg and embryo research is not 
unique in its moral valence. Individuals may hold strong views about the eth-
ics of commercial research, especially where research may lead to the produc-
tion of pharmaceutical or other products that they and others may not be able 
to access because of limited financial resources. Tissue providers of all kinds 
may also feel morally implicated where their genetic material is used in the 
hunt for certain kinds of genetic relationships-for example, between sex and 
spatial reasoning skills or between race and intelligence. Because cells from 
any part of the body may be used in these kinds of research projects, these 
concerns apply equally to human embryos, excised cancer tissue, and routine 
157. See supra Part D.C. 
158. See supra Part D.B. 
159. See supra Part D.C. 
160. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 1004. 
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blood samples. 161 While the government may not be able to prohibit these 
kinds of genetic studies from going forward,162 surely private individuals 
should be permitted to make their strongly held preferences known and to have 
those preferences respected. 
Regret in hyperchoice decision making may tum not only on the moral 
weight accorded to the decision, but also on the nature of the decision and 
relationship between the choices offered. For some tissues, selecting A may in 
fact effectively preclude selecting B, C, and D, simply because the tissue in 
question (for example, human eggs) is a finite and discrete resource. Alterna-
tively, regret may result as much from trying to do too much as from trying to 
select one item among many. Regret in these instances may manifest as a 
result of sequential decision making, with its attendant increasing fatigue and 
psychological strain. 163 In this vein, one group of researchers notes that our 
multiple consumer obligations-more choices, but less time-"may not con-
tribute as much to quality of life as once thought or hoped fOr."I64 This sug-
gests that anguish in decision making does not arise solely from the 
opportunity costs of giving up other options, but may also result from trying to 
take part in too many opportunities at the same time. As our commitments to 
autonomy and control inform tiered consent, the psychology of regret threat-
ens to cause tissue providers, once again, either to opt out or, ultimately, to 
view the consent-provision process negatively. 
Emerging research about the implications of hyperchoice and the psychol-
ogy of decision making thus suggest definite and significant limits for both the 
number of options available in a tiered consent menu and the amount of in-
formation that potential tissue providers can process about each option. Addi-
tionally, in some instances these findings seem to bear more heavily on some 
kinds of tissue research than on others. For instance, providers of human eggs 
and embryos may experience fewer difficulties arising from sequential deci-
sion making owing to the fact that these tissues are more likely to be finite 
research resources. Yet, these providers may experience greater difficulties 
arising from classic consumer choice problems (they may be unable to provide 
tissue for every category of research they deem worthwhile), as well as possi-
bly greater moral unease about providing reproductive tissue for research of 
different kinds. Alternatively, while providers of cancer tissue or blood sam-
ples may be able to supply sufficient tissue for any and all research categories 
they find worthwhile, these individuals will face greater stress arising from 
sequential decision making. 
161. See supra Pan I.C. 
162. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et aI., Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity 
ofGovemmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128, 160-63 (1983); John 
A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1203,1212-14 (1978). 
163. See supra Pans n.B, m.B. 
164. Mick et aI., supra note 90, at 207. 
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In all of these instances, findings that information overload causes deci-
sion makers to opt out of decision making, to make less informed decisions 
when they participate, and to experience greater feelings of regret over deci-
sion making make clear that information dumping is inconsistent with the 
principles underlying the doctrine of informed consent. Despite current medi-
cal practices to disclose any and all information as a shield to liability (and the 
greater legal imperative to disclose in the context of research), presenting 
potential tissue providers with a large number of options, or excessive infor-
mation about these options, may lead to consent procedures that are less, rather 
than more, worthy of legal and ethical support. Tiered consent, while very 
likely a best practice for human tissue research, must be designed with full 
cognizance of and appreciation for the limitations of the human mind in order 
to better facilitate decision making that is truly informed and freely given. 
-------~-------
As human tissue research proliferates, research institutions and 
biorepositories, and those crafting the policies that govern these entities, will 
face increasing pressure to make more tissue available for more projects. 
Meanwhile, those concerned with ensuring informed consent will surely press 
for enhanced protection for those providing tissue for research, such as the 
inclusion of more research categories in existing tiered consent forms. Some-
where along this spectrum, legislators, agencies, and courts will have to carve 
out reasonable policies that respect the interests of both tissue providers and 
researchers. At the very least, this charge demands a change in existing stan-
dards to include human tissue research in, rather than exempt it from, the legal 
rules and doctrines governing human subjects research generally. Moreover, in 
an effort to strike a balance between competing interests in ethical conduct and 
efficient research, policymakers should affirmatively encourage or mandate 
tiered consent as a best practice. The precise details of what tiered consent 
should contain must be informed by findings about cognitive limitations lead-
ing to lower quality decision making, checking out, and regret in situations of 
hyperchoice. While a specific number or description of categories is premature 
at this time (and must await future study), the implications of consumer psy-
chology for tiered consent and abundant choice stand as a stark caution sign 
that increasing providers' options will not always create correspondingly 
greater provider control. 
Barry Schwartz, a scholar of the psychology of decision making, suggests 
that the data on hyperchoice mean that we "would be well served to rethink 
[our] worship of choice.,,165 Indeed, in providing examples of how America is 
overly obsessed with choice, Schwartz highlights the bedrock principles of 
patient autonomy, writing, "medical ethicists treat the idea of 'patient auton-
omy' as sacrosanct, as if it goes without saying that having patients choose 
165. Schwartz, supra note 143, at 74. 
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their treatments will make them better off."I66 Schwartz's sentiment seems 
quite overstated, even if well-intentioned. Patient autonomy is important, not 
in the least because we have learned on several occasions how detrimental 
medical paternalism and lack of consent can be. 167 Moreover, even Schwartz 
admits that some choice is essential to human happiness and well-being. 168 
Schwartz's point, however, is well taken. Excessive choice may lead to 
lower quality decision making--decision making that is less informed and that 
makes use of information that is less well understood. The risks of hyper-
choice are real and significant. Essentializing and the fatigue associated with 
sequential decision making risk consent that is not informed. Arbitrary selec-
tion, opting out, and fear of regret about making the wrong morally relevant 
choice threaten to undermine potential tissue providers' desire to provide tis-
sue for meaningful research. 
Still, tiered consent is likely to be the best way forward for obtaining 
appropriate consent from tissue providers. All available evidence demonstrates 
that having some choice is far preferable to having none (other than between 
participation and nonparticipation). Project-specific consent is likewise unat-
tractive not only for its persisting administrative difficulties, but also because 
it poses psychological burdens of its own. Thus, tiered consent, despite the 
potential pitfalls of information overload and hyperchoice, continues to repre-
sent the most promising methodology for serving the principles of disclosure, 
understanding, competency, voluntariness, and authorization that under gird 
informed consent-and doing so without overburdening either tissue providers 
or the research system. 
Further empirical research on the psychology of decision making and the 
scope of information load is needed, especially research focused on decisions 
made outside of the consumer context. In the first instance, it is unclear 
whether the ideal set sizes observed in consumer settings are applicable to 
informed consent. Various studies have shown that, with respect to consumer 
decision making, set sizes of six are preferable to those of thirty,169 sets of six 
are preferable to those of twenty-four,170 and sets of three or six are preferable 
166.ld. 
167. The Nuremburg Code resulted from the post-World WaI II trials of doctors conducting 
unethical medical experiments on persons in concentration camps. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE 
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (George 1. Annas & Michael 
A. Grodin eds., 1992) (providing a history and analysis of the Nazi experiments, the Nuremberg 
trials, the Nuremberg Code, and its relationship to modem medical ethics). The American experi-
ence includes the Tuskegee experiments, in which African American men infected with syphilis 
were monitored, but left untreated, so that reseaIChers could observe the disease's progression. 
None of this reseaIch was done with informed p3Ilicipant consent. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, The Tuskegee Timeline (May 23, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchstplodltuskegeel 
time.htm. 
168. SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 3. 
169. IyengaI & Lepper, supra note 84, at 999. 
170. ld. at 997-98. 
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to sets of nine. 171 Meanwhile, research also shows that sets of both six and 
thirty are preferable to no-choice conditions. 172 These results certainly support 
the conclusion that tiered consent is preferable to blanket consent; some choice 
is preferable to virtually none. Yet, do these results also indicate that tiered 
consent menus should include fewer than nine options? Intuitively, a list of 
roughly ten options seems likely to be a reasonable approximation of what the 
human mind can handle. This intuition lends additional support to my previous 
recommendation of a tiered consent of eight options for providing eggs for 
third-party use in Canada. 173 Still, this conclusion is simply an intuition, and its 
persuasive force is far from obvious, especially given the considerable com-
plexity of the options in a tiered consent menu. Only with greater empirical 
findings can tiered consent models be appropriately designed to support and 
facilitate the choice and autonomy of tissue providers, while not overburden-
ing potential tissue providers through information overload likely to lead indi-
viduals to opt out of decision making. 
The importance of this research should not be underestimated. Numerous 
legal and ethics experts have already called for comprehensive changes in or 
wholesale replacement of national regulations and legal standards governing 
the provision of human tissue for research. 174 Expert bodies and ongoing re-
search industries have advocated, and in some instances already adopted, 
tiered consent as a best practice. 175 As legislators, agencies, and courts, work-
ing with ethicists and researchers, tum to implementing the best practice of 
tiered consent, they must be cognizant that, in an effort to give tissue providers 
choice, they do not instead end up undermining the essence of informed con-
sent. 
171. Id. at 996 (discussing Danielle Timmermans, The Impact of Task Complexity on 
Information Use in Multi-Attribute Decision Making, 61. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 95 
(1993) (finding that decision makers used an elimination strategy twenty-one percent of the time 
when presented with three options, thirty-one percent of the time when presented with six option, 
and seventy-seven percent of the time when presented with nine options)). 
172. /d. at 1002 --{)3. 
173. Ram, supra note 5, at 24. 
174. See, e.g., Ashburn et a!., supra note 20, at 3378 (observing that "the current system for 
protecting tissue donors, which has worked in well in the past, is becoming and will continue to 
become increasingly obsolete"); Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective 
Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health 
Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 737 (1999) (criticizing the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission's 1999 report for confining itself to the structures of the Common Rule, and offering 
an alternative proposal that departs from the Common Rule's framework); Robert F. Weir, The 
Ongoing Debate About Stored Tissue Samples, Research, and Informed Consent, in 2 NAT'L 
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at F-I, F-18 (recommending an update to the 
Common Rule's provisions regarding informed consent and waiver of informed consent). 
175. See, e.g., EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 134 (advocating tiered consent as a best 
practice); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 64-65 (same); Ram, supra note 
5 (same); Model Consent, supra note 73 (employing tiered consent in the model informed consent 
document for the National Cancer Institute); Univ. of S. Me. Bioethics Project, supra note 76. 
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